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ABSTRACT
A SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION ANALYSIS
OF REGULATOR SELECTION AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. Patrick C. Mann
Increasing electricity prices have recently intensified concern
regarding the effectiveness of the regulatory process. In numerous
states, questions are being raised about the effectiveness of elected
regulators relative to those commissioners who are appointed. The
central purpose of this article is to determine whether elected or
appointed regulators exert the strongest influence on electricity
prices paid by residential, commercial, and industrial consumers.
Seemingly unrelated regression equations were developed for 1967,
1973, and 1979 data. The 1967 data produced evidence of a constrain-
ing influence on electricity rates by appointed regulators, relative
to elected regulators. The 1973 and 1979 data, in contrast, indicated
a dampening effect by elected regulators on certain electricity rates.
This conflicting trend over time, however, provides relatively weak
support for the hypothesis that elected regulators have been respon-
sible for setting lower rates than appointed regulators, either in
past periods of passive regulation or in the recent decade of more
active regulation.

A SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION ANALYSIS
OF REGULATOR SELECTION AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. and Patrick C. Mann
I . INTRODUCTION
Public utility regulation has been subjected to intense criticism
in recent years. The adequacy of traditional regulatory objectives,
such as control of earnings (prevention of monopoly profits), control
of prices (prevention of excessive price discrimination) , and control
of service, are being challenged by external forces (Trebing, 1977).
These external pressures include high rates of inflation, increasing
consumer militancy, decreasing supplies of inexpensive fuels, changing
technology, and increasing environmental concern. They are each par-
tially responsible for and collectively constitute a set of circum-
stances which has intensified concern regarding the performance of
state regulatory commissions. Although some argue that historically
electric utility regulation has not been effective there is consensus
that the present environment in which public utilities operate makes
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the regulatory task much more difficult than in the past. The exter-
nal pressures have forced regulators to alter behavior and practices.
Yet, public discontent, in the face of persistently increasing utility
bills, has intensified. This discontent is indicated in organized
efforts to change the method of selecting utility regulators. Recent
referenda in Ohio and Michigan, as well as strong political ferment in
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other states exemplify this discontent. Proponents for change argue
that elected commissions would better perform the regulatory function
than appointed commissions. A relevant and unresolved Issue is whether
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the method of regulator selection influences rate levels and rate
structures.
The regulatory process is inherently a political process whose out-
comes vary with certain political variables. We view public utility
regulation in the context of conflicting interest groups with regula-
tors subject to political pressures from these groups. Factors such as
the method of commissioner selection are presumed to affect the rela-
tive benefits (and losses) among the two primary adversary groups, pro-
ducers and consumers.
In brief, regulators are presumed to be more than mediators between
producers and consumers— i.e., they act in their self-interest to maxi-
mize their preference functions. Specifically, we hypothesize that
directly elected regulators (reflecting relatively higher voter input
to regulatory decision-making) permit lower electricity prices as com-
pared with appointed regulators (reflecting relatively lower voter
input). We hypothesize that elected regulators will reflect strong
opposition to rate increases while appointed regulators will provide
lesser opposition. In sum, we hypothesize that regulatory arrangement
affects the regulatory outcome.
II. THEORIES OF REGULATION
Mann (1974) discussed the significance of political power in the
setting of electricity rates. It is apparent that the actual regula-
tory environment is much more complex than most of the theoretical
literature suggests; and that, as Joskow (1973) argued, actual under-
standing of the process can be enhanced by broadening the analytical
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focus to incorporate behavioral matters. To create a conceptual frame-
work for our analysis, alternative theories of economic regulation need
to be examined.
There are several ways of categorizing the different theories of
regulation. Primeaux and Nelson (1980) employed two broad categories:
the benefit theory of regulation, which asserts that various interest
groups control or "capture" the regulatory process; and the wealth
redistribution theory of regulation which emphasizes that regulation
cannot avoid cross-subsidization across user classes. Trebing (1980,
1981) used similar categories: the capture theory; the coalition
building theory (regulators via cross-subsidization form political
coalitions); and the equity-stability theory, in which regulators act
to protect the public from the direct effects of market forces and in
which equity considerations dominate efficiency goals.
The capture theory can be attributed to Stigler (1971). He
asserted that regulation is generally captured by the regulated
industry and is operated primarily for its benefit. However, Stigler
acknowledged the potential for capture by other politically effective
groups and allowed for the non-capture of regulators. The wealth
redistribution theory of regulation can be attributed to Posner (1974).
Regulatory behavior is influenced by various coalitions of politically
effective interest groups. Thus, regulation can be perceived as a
system of public finance (Posner, 1971), facilitated by internal cross-
subsidization. The regulated firm is allowed to provide some services
at prices less than actual cost by providing other services at prices
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exceeding costs. Posner acknowledged that the cross-subsidization is
generally compatible with the objectives of the regulators.
The capture theory of regulation is not necessarily in conflict with
the wealth redistribution theory of regulation. The former focuses on
regulators serving the interests of politically effective groups while
the latter focuses on regulation as a vehicle for redistributing wealth
among interest groups. Stigler and Posner concurred that regulators do
not exclusively serve a single interest group, but instead make contin-
uous decisions over time regarding whom to favor (Peltzman, 1976).
An empirical question is whether regulation makes a difference re-
garding price. Stigler and Friedland (1962) found, for 1912-1937, that
regulation per se had no effect on average electricity rates. Jackson
(1969), in a similar analysis for 1940-1960, found that regulatory
variables added little to the explanatory power of an electricity price
equation, except in 1960. The emergence of regulation as an important
factor in the terminal year is attributed to a change in the regulatory
environment. Historically, due to economies of scale and technological
improvements, the trend of electric utility costs has been downward.
In recent decades, the cost trend has been reversed. This reversal has
altered the relationship between the regulated firms, consumers, and
regulators.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF REGULATORY ARRANGEMENT
The regulatory process involves the regulated firms and the regula-
tors, as well as other potential participants (e.g., consumer inter-
veners). In this context, regulators have utility functions which they
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seek to maximize given the cost-rewards confronting them (Hilton, 1972)
Therefore, an interesting question is whether the mode of regulator
selection has an effect on electricity pricing. One might speculate
that this aspect of regulatory arrangement has had a greater impact on
electricity prices in the recent era of more active regulation than in
the past era of more passive regulation.
Joskow (1972) constructed a model which indicated that regulators
are influenced by more than capital costs in determining allowed rates
of return. These factors include the reasonableness of the rate of
return request, presence of intervenors (i.e., allowed rates of return
were inversely related to the extent of intervenor testimony) , and pre-
sence of cost of capital testimony supporting the utility's request
(i.e., rates of return were positively related to the extent of sup-
porting testimony).
Eckert (1973) examined the nature of costs and rewards confronting
regulators. His proposition was that regulators have their utility
functions shaped by factors such as income, regulatory tenure, post
regulatory employment, and desire to please interest groups. While
acknowledging that regulators pursue interests including pecuniary and
political advantage, Samuels (1973) noted that different regulators
pursue different objectives, which in most cases are complex and con-
tinuously changing. Russell and Shelton (1974) asserted that the
interaction between regulator utility functions and external forces
help explain regulator behavior. They formulate behavioral models that
focus on the distribution of income between the public utility and con-
sumers, and between user classes.
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Gormley (1981) examined the question of the method of selecting
commissioners. Presuming that the direct election of regulators and
increased public participation are alternative means to a similar end,
he asserted that less public participation should be associated with
states where regulators are elected. In brief, with elected regulators,
there is reduced public participation because the public presumes regu-
lators are more responsive to the public interest. Although his empir-
ical results tend to support this proposition, Gormley acknowledged
that direct election may not achieve the anticipated effects since in
a complex area such as public utility regulation, political activity
may not be necessarily effective.
Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) focused on the economic and political
variables that can affect allowed rates of return. Their results pro-
vide insight on the linkage of regulatory arrangement and regulatory
outcome. As anticipated, economic variables such as risk, utility size,
rate base valuation method, and prevailing interest rates influenced
allowed rates of return. In addition, terms of commissioners were
positively related to rates of return, suggesting that regulators with
shorter terras have increased sensitivity to public pressure. The regu-
lator selection method emerged as statistically insignificant and with
the wrong sign. This result is inconsistent with conventional wisdom
that elected commissioners are more responsive to the public interest
than are appointed commissioners.
A recent study of regulatory arrangement is one by Harris and
Navarro (1983). Based on a statistical analysis incorporating a single
year's data (1980) and employing a singular dependent variable (average
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price), the authors concluded that the apparent linkage of lower elec-
tricity rates and states having elected commissioners cannot be statis-
tically attributed to the regulator selection method. Their conclusion
is derived from a model which allegedly excludes any variable which
could be influenced by the regulator selection process.
IV. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The research objective is to determine the effect of regulatory
selection on electric rates paid by consumers. In the electric utility
industry, block rates are generally used to establish consumer bills.
That is, all consumers for a given company, with similar utilization,
are charged the same price for a given block of usage. One difficulty
with using the block rates of individual firms as price data, is that
the rate schedules for the different companies are not comparable either
in the number of rate blocks or consumption breakpoints. Because of
problems of data comparability, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
prepares rate data which are weighted averages of rate categories; these
data make a rate comparison among firms possible and are the prices
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employed in this study.
Rates for a given electric utility firm are all established at one
time; that is, all residential rates are established in conjunction
with the setting of commercial and industrial rates. Consequently,
ordinary least squares regressions is an inappropriate technique. In
contrast, the seemingly unrelated regression approach (SUR) is appro-
priate when the disturbance term of one regression are correlated with
the disturbance term of another regression. One anticipates that such
a condition exists in the electricity rate setting process.
Seven different price equations were estimated. The general model
for the SUR regressions is of the form:
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The firm subscript k is dropped to simplify notation.
The specific variables included in the SUR model for the seven dif-
ferent price equations are:
Dependent Variables :
PR = Monthly residential bill for 100 KWH ($)
PR = Monthly residential bill for 500 KWH ($)
PR = Monthly residential bill for 1,000 KWH ($)
PCL
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= Monthly commercial bill for 375 KWH ($)
PC Q
= Monthly commercial bill for 10,000 KWH ($)
PI = Monthly industrial bill for 30,000 KWH ($)
PI /nn nnn = Monthly industrial bill for 400,000 KWH ($)4(JU , uuu
Independent Variables :
DAP = Dummy variable for method of regulator selection
(0 = elected; 1 = appointed)
SALES Total KHW sales (billions)
TAX = Tax payments on electric operations per 1,000 KWH
sales to ultimate consumers ($)
PEXP = Total production expense per 1,000 KWH produced ($)
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DEXP = Electric distribution expense per 1,000 KWH sales to
ultimate consumers ($)
FIN = Finance proxy variable; long-term debt per $1,000 of
equity ($)
WAGES = Wages and salaries (millions) per 1,000,000 KWH sales ($)
PUR = Purchased power as a percent of total KWH sales
RS = KWH sales for resale (thousands)
RSCUST = Residential KWH sales per residential customer (thousands)
CSCUST = Commercial KWH sales per commercial customer (thousands)
ISCUST = Industrial KWH sales per industrial customer (thousands).
The seven price variables listed above are the dependent variables
of the seven equation SUR model.
A key variable is the dummy variable used to isolate the differen-
tial effect of method of regulator selection (DAP) on electricity
prices, holding numerous cost, demand and environmental conditions con-
stant. This variable should take a positive sign if appointed regula-
tors allow higher rates than elected regulators.
SALES is a scale variable included to take utility size difference
into consideration. To the extent that economies of scale accrue to
larger utilities, this variable should take a negative sign. TAX, PEXP,
DEXP represent tax, production, and distribution expenses, incurred by
the utility firm. All three of these variables should take positive
signs.
FIN is included to isolate the effect of financial structure on the
price paid for electricity. FIN is important because finance will
affect an electric utility's price structure by either causing prices
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to be lower if financial leverage is beneficial to the consumer or it
may cause consumer prices to be higher if the leverage becomes exces-
sive, as many utility executives believe. The direction of the sign
for this variable is not self-evident. For a firm which is too highly
levered, the sign should be positive. For other firms, the sign should
be negative.
WAGES represent firm wage and salary levels. This variable is
included to hold regional differences constant. As noted later, a
number of firms in the sample are located in the South. Consequently,
wage rates will tend to neutralize regional differences in utility cost
of operations. This variable should take a positive sign.
RSCUST, CSCUST and ISCUST represent residential, commercial and
industrial consumption per customer. These variables are included to
isolate the price effects of different levels of usage by consumer
types. These variables should take positive signs; i.e., the higher
the consumer usage, the higher the price.
PUR represents a purchased power variable and RS is a sales-for-
resale variable. These variables are included to consider firm dif-
ferences both in terms of dependence upon other firms for electricity
supply and as buyers of electricity produced for resale. The effect of
these actions on consumer prices depends upon whether the buying firm
is paying a relatively high or low price for purchased power; similarly,
consumer prices may also be affected by the price received for exported
power. The latter effect would be caused by the utility charging rela-
tively high or low prices to resale customers. In either case, these
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variables should affect consumer prices, although the direction of the
expected sign is ambiguous.
We anticipate DAP to be positively related to electricity price,
hypothesizing that elected regulators are more sensitive to political
pressure than are appointed commissioners. That is, we presume that
elected regulators are subject to direct voter displeasure on matters
of electricity rates. In contrast, decisions of appointed regulators
affect those parties (governor, legislature) that have appointed them;
however, since these selectors are confronted with numerous election
issues, this reduces the importance of regulatory decisions in the
electoral process. In this context, elected regulators should permit
lower rate increases than appointed regulators. In brief, we antici-
pate this outcome due to the presumption of relatively higher public
opposition to rate increases reflected through directly elected regula-
tors as compared to the lesser opposition reflected through appointed
regulators.
Joskow (1974) designated 1969 as the switchpoint in electric util-
ity regulation. Prior to 1969, given minimal inflation offset by tech-
nological innovation and the attainment of economies of scale, electric
utilities requested few rate of return reviews. After 1969, given rapid
inflation not counterbalanced by economies of scale and technological
change, there was a substantial increase in rate increase requests.
The use of multiple cross-sectional regressions should both enhance the
validity of the empirical results, as well as test the hypothesis that
regulatory arrangement had lesser impact on electricity rates in the
era of more passive regulation (prior to 1969) than it has had in the
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recent decade of more active regulation. The years 1967, 1973 and 1979
were selected for examination.
The sample consists of 73 privately-owned firms for 1967 (14 in
jurisdictions selecting utility commissioners by election; 59 being in
states where regulators are appointed). The 1973 sample consists of 72
firms (14 in states where commission members are elected; 58 from juris-
dictions where regulators are appointed). The 1979 sample is made up
of 71 firms (14 in states where commissioners are chosen by election;
57 in states where regulators are appointed)
.
The sample includes only those electric utilities that: (1) pro-
vide service to industrial and commercial as well as residential custom-
ers, and (2) provide service within a single state in which there was
state regulatory jurisdiction over privately-owned electric utilities,
for the years 1967, 1973, and 1979. States electing commissioners and
represented in the sample (with number of utilities in parentheses)
include Alabama (1), Arizona (2), Florida (4), Georgia (2), Louisiana
(2), Mississippi (2), and Oklahoma (1).
Electricity prices were employed as the dependent variables, as
opposed to rate of return. While allowed rate of return is an impor-
tant indicator of regulatory influence, this profit measure as a de-
pendent variable poses several problems. First, the actual rate of
return varies with whether or not the electric utility is successful in
achieving its permitted rate of return. Second, the electric utility
may be willing to violate the constraint of the allowed rate of return
since the regulatory agency has limited reaction options. Third, as
indicated by Hagerman and Ratchford (1978), allowed rates of return are
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affected primarily by variables such as utility size, rate base valua-
tion method, and prevailing interest rates; electricity price may be
more sensitive to regulatory arrangement and thus worth examining.
Moreover, as Joskow (1974) noted, regulators tend to focus on price
rather than rate of return.
V. REGULATOR SELECTION AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
Table 1 presents the mean values for the variables in the analysis
of electricity bills. The mean statistics clearly show the substantial
increases in electricity rates and electricity production costs that
have occurred since 1973. In contrast, the increases in electricity
rates and costs between 1967 and 1973 were relatively small.
Tables 2 through 7 present the regression results for the rate
categories examined. There are three residential equations, two com-
mercial equations and two industrial equations for each of the three
years. The overall results indicate that the method of regulator
selection does not have a significant and consistent impact on electri-
city prices.
1967 Results
The most significant price impact was observed in 1967; yet, the
effect was not general or consistent. As Table 2 shows, during that
year, DAP was negative and statistically significant for both the 500
and 1,000 KWH residential rate categories, indicating that during the
1967 period, appointed regulators tended to set lower residential rates
than elected regulators; the 100 KWH rate, however, was unaffected by
method of regulator selection.
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Table 3 shows that the 375 KWH commercial rate was also reduced by
appointed regulators compared with elected regulators. Other commer-
cial and residential rates for 1967, however, were unaffected by the
method of selection.
The signs on the statistically significant variables in the 1967
equations were generally in the expected direction. However, in Table
2, RSCUST is negative and statistically significant at the one percent
level in equation 3. Also, WAGES is negative and statistically signi-
ficant in equations 5, 6, and 7; the level of significance ranged from
three to six percent.
1973 Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the equations for 1973. Table 4 shows that
the only residential rate affected by method of regulator selection
was the 100 KWH price. In contrast to the 1967 results, this rate was
higher when regulators were appointed than where they were elected.
The only other rates affected by method of regulator selection were the
30,000 and 400,000 KWH industrial rates. The data show that these
rates were both higher where regulators were appointed compared with
situations where regulators were elected. In 1973, the signs for DAP
were all positive, indicating some upward pressure on rates whenever
regulators were appointed, compared with when they were elected.
The signs on most of the statistically significant variables in the
1973 equations were in the expected direction; the one exception was
the RSCUST variable in equation 10, Table 4, which was negative and
statistically significant at the ten percent level.
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1979 Results
The signs on most of the statistically significant variables in the
1979 equations were in the expected direction; the one exception was
the DEXP variable in equation 17 in Table 6. This sign was negative
and statistically significant at the three percent level.
Tables 6 and 7 reveal that none of the seven rates were affected by
method of regulator selection in 1979. However, the signs on all but
one of the regulator selection dummy variables were positive, indicating
some upward pressure on all rates where regulators were appointed com-
pared with jurisdictions where they were elected. As mentioned earlier,
in 1973 all but one of the selection dummy variable coefficients were
positive, indicating some upward pressure on rates where regulators are
appointed. That upward pressure continued through 1979.
Overall, the results show that the method of regulator selection
does not seem to have a significant effect on electricity rates; conse-
quently, the primary hypothesis of this study is not validated. Yet,
the direction in the movement of relative rates through time is consis-
tent with our expectations. Nevertheless, we expected the magnitude of
the movement, or shifts in the importance of method of regulator selec-
tion, to be more important than the research results show. This expec-
tation was based on the external pressures which have emerged since
1967 to which elected regulators would seem to be more sensitive than
regulators selected by appointment. While the direction of the change
is consistent with our expectations, as reflected in the empirical
data, the magnitude of the differential reaction was much smaller than
expected. Indeed, the reaction to external pressure was insufficient
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to cause elected regulators to set rates which were statistically lower
than those set by appointed regulators.
The Potential for Multicollinearity
Maddala (1977) notes that multicollinearity is serious if deletions
or additions of sample observations produce large changes in the regres-
sion coefficient estimates. In an attempt to determine whether multi-
collinearity affected the statistical results, we employed a procedure
partially adapted from Maddala' s discussion.
Three variations of the sample were tried. The first variation was
a selection of five observations to be eliminated from each year of the
original sample. This elimination amounted to six to seven percent of
the observations, depending upon the year used to compute the percentage
reduction. The candidates for omission were selected by the use of a
table of random numbers; three firms from states which appointed regu-
lators and two firms from states which elected regulators were omitted.
In the second variation, an alternative group of five firms was
eliminated from the sample. The five firms eliminated in the first
variation were restored to the sample. As in the first variation, firms
omitted were selected by the use of a table of random numbers. All
firms selected for this reduction were located in states which appointed
regulators. The third variation consisted of the combined elimination
of both sample subsets discussed above. This reduction amounted to
approximately 14 percent of the total number of observations in the
original sample; the sample reduction was composed of two firms from
states which elected regulators and eight firms from states which
appointed regulators.
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The seven equation SUR model was run for each of the three sample
variations for each of the three years. The results indicated that the
sample variations affected the regulator selection dummy variable (DAP)
only minimally; since DAP is the variable of most importance in
answering the questions raised by this research, multicollinearity did
not seem to be causing serious problems. For example, 63 additional
equations were estimated; the dummy variable results deviated from that
at the original sample in only seven cases. That is, the DAP results
in all reduced sample variations were quite consistent with those of
the same equations run with the whole sample. This consistency was
both in terms of statistical significance as well as in terms of the
signs for the DAP coefficients. On the basis of this consistency, one
can reasonably conclude that the equations from the original sample
were not seriously affected by multicollinearity.
VI. CONCLUSION
An underlying premise herein is that regulators are an important
third party in the regulatory process; they are not simply mediators
between producers and consumers. They are a group motivated by multi-
ple factors and along with producers and consumers, seek to achieve
certain benefits from the regulatory-political process. In this con-
text, our focus has been on the linkage between regulator selection and
regulatory outcome.
The regressions employing the 1967, 1973, and 1979 data indicate a
trend in the relationship between the method of regulator selection and
electricity rates. The 1967, data produced evidence of some constraining
influence on electricity rates by appointed regulators, relative to
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elected regulators. This was contrary to our expectations. The 1973
and 1979 data produced weak evidence of a dampening effect on electri-
city rates by elected regulators. This trend, however, was too weak
to lend support to the hypothesis that regulatory arrangement had an
important impact on rates either in the past era of passive regulation
or in the recent decade of more active regulation. That is, there is
little evidence that elected regulators set substantially lower rates
than appointed regulators.
The lack of a consistent and strong association between selection
method and electricity prices can possibly be attributed to several fac-
tors. First, direct election of regulators may have the same apparent
effect as the substitution of public for private ownership of public
utilities. That is, public interest and participation in regulatory
matters may decrease since consumers may assume (incorrectly in some
cases) that elected regulators will automatically act in their inter-
ests. Second, regulators may not actually have the flexibility neces-
sary in setting rates and are unable to behave as our primary hypothesis
dictates. The discretion of public utility commissioners is not only
circumscribed by factors outside their control (e.g., energy prices)
but also by legislated administrative procedures, judicial review, and
federal legislation. Third, the effectiveness of state regulators is
partly a function of staff competence and resources. An understaffed
and inadequately funded commission encounters difficulty in monitoring
public utility performance and in evaluating the appropriateness of
rate hike requests.
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FOOTNOTES
For example see Phillips (1975).
2
For example see Stigler-Friedland (1962).
3
In Illinois, there has been movement to change from appointed
public utility commissioners to elected regulators (Chicago Tribune
,
March 6, 1979). Similarly, in Michigan, there has been pressure for a
change from appointed to elected commissioners (Lansing State Journal
,
December 18, 1980). In a Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)
hearing before the West Virginia Public Service Commission involving
Appalachian Power Company, several consumers conveyed belief in the no-
tion that, "where PSC officials are appointed, the rate demands of the
electric utilities are met; where PSC officials are elected by the pub-
lic, the rate demands of the electric utilities are rejected." The West
Virginia Legislature held public hearings on the selection of public
utility commissioners (Morgantown Dominion-Post , January 21, 1982).
4
Typical Electric Bills
,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(formerly Federal Power Commission), for various years. Typical elec-
tric bills for an individual electric utility are recorded for each
city served. In general, the bills are the same, but where differences
existed, the modal bill was selected.
The SUR model is an improvement over ordinary least squares (OLS)
when contemporaneous correlation of the error terras is present. Since
SUR uses more information than OLS, there is an efficiency gain in the
estimating process.
Data sources for price data were discussed earlier. Data for cost,
customer characteristics, operating levels, and financial characteris-
tics were taken from Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities
in the United States , Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (formerly
Federal Power Commission), for various years. The state per capita in-
come data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States . Com-
pany data for salaries and wages are from Compustat tapes.
In 1967, public utility commissioners were directly elected in
14 states; the same was true for 1973. In the remaining states, com-
missioners are appointed by the governor, except in South Carolina and
Virginia, where they are appointed by the legislature. The statistics
regarding the number of states with direct elections (14) are somewhat
misleading. For example, Minnesota made the transition from elected
to appointed commissioners during the period 1967-1976; by 1976, the
Minnesota PSC was fully composed of appointed commissioners. Since
Minnesota did not commence regulation of electric utilities until
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January 1975, utilities serving Minnesota were excluded from our analy-
sis. Similarly, Texas and South Dakota (elected states) did not ini-
tiate regulation of electric utilities until 1976; electric utilities
serving these states were excluded from the analysis. Nebraska (an
elected state) does not have any investor-owned electric utilities
serving the state. Montana and North Dakota (elected states) were not
represented in the sample since no privately-owned electrics serve
either of those states exclusively. Finally, Florida changed from
elected to appointed regulators in January 1979. Given the lags in
the rate review process, Florida was retained in the elected category
for 1979.
-21-
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TABLE 1
MEAN VALUES FOR ALL VARIABLES
1967 1973 1979
PR100 4.073 4.755 7.471
PR500 10.560 12.540 23.620
PRIOOO 18.767 22.139 43.454
PC375 14.579 17.231 27.524
PC10,000 234.595 282.280 501.047
PI30,000 487.630 605.708 1,208.750
PI400,000 4,918.000 6,270.000 13,805.000
DAP .808 .806 .803
SALES 9.071 11.368 13.113
TAX 3.666 2.938 4.180
PEXP 4.418 7.230 20.853
DEXP 1.261 1.294 1.829
FIN 1.381 1.489 1.362
WAGES 2.719 3.200 4.200
PUR .224 .227 .258
RS .082 .079 .090
RSCUST 5.270 7.740 8.045
CSCUST 31.722 49.815 53.984
ISCUST 3,963.000 4,592.000 4,570.000
TABLE 2
SUR EQUATIONS
RESIDENTIAL RATES
1967
Independent
Variables Dependent Variables N=73
(1) (2) (3)
PR100 PR500 PR1000
DAP -.2243 -1.0719 -1.4304
(.1998) (.4320)* (.6482)*
SALES -.0024 .0029 -.0051
(.0037) (.0081) (.0122)
TAX .1298 .8549 .9445
(.063)** (.1484)* (.2226)*
PEXP .0354 .2881 .4136
(.0748) (.1620)** (.2431)**
DEXP .1822 .5265 1.2575
(.2392) (.5165) (.7749)**
FIN .3455 .9169 .6202
(.2548)*** (.5504)** (.8258)
WAGES .1377 -.1284 .3531
(.1496) (.3233) (.4851)
PUR -.1736 -.4806 -.8614
(.3578) (.7729) (1.1596)
RS -.0892 -2.5699 -4.5976
(.7241) (1.5634)** (2.3456)**
RSCUST -.0264 .0581 -.2984
(.0373) (.0907) (.1365)*
CONSTANT 2.7482 5.4218 14.3778
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at 1 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
**Signif icant at 5 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
***Signif icant at 10 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
TABLE 3
SUR EQUATIONS
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL RATES
1967
Independent
Variables Dependent Variables N=73
COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL
(4) (5) (6) (7)
PC375 PC10,000 PI30,000 PI400,000
DAP -1.5994 -12.7697 1.9419 -83.1378
(1.2313)*** (18.7709) (38.2516) (387.4180)
SALES ' -.0141 .0888 -.2205 -1.5714
(.0229) (.3500) (.7118) (7.2099)
TAX -.2125 2.1154 40.6527 335.0570
(.4151) (6.3287) (12.8979)* (130.6320)*
PEXP .1854 11.1712 13.1620 284.0910
(.4585) (6.9904)** (14.2445) (144.2690)**
DEXP 3.7807 63.3997 78.8804 668.7820
(1.4790)* (22.5463)* (45.9458)** (465.3490)***
FIN -3.2322 -45.8680 -73.5842 -841.3290
(1.5782)** (24.0596)** (48.9283)*** (495.5640)**
WAGES -.5986 -25.1506 -53.3148 -442.4540
(.9259) (14.1154)** (28.7270)** (290.9290)***
PUR -3.4620 -80.6201 -127.2000 -1678.0500
(2.2143)** (33.7558)* (68.7226)** (696.0230)*
RS 5.9083 70.3597 92.4320 -342.3570
(4.4885)*** (68.4243) (140.7000) (1424.3200)
CSCUST -.0134
(.0212)
.3465
(.3266)
ISCUST .0005
(.0013)
-.0070
(.0133)
CONSTANT 18.0028 237.6980 446.7570 4469.9400
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at 1 percent confidence level (one-tailed test)
.
**Signif icant at 5 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
***Signif icant at 10 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
TABLE 4
SUR EQUATIONS
RESIDENTIAL RATES
1973
Independent
Variables Dependent Variables N=72
(8) (9) (10)
PR100 PR500 PR1000
DAP .6237 .5747 .3362
(.2681)* (.5538) (.8322)
SALES .0026 .0153 .0083
(.0082) (.0168) (.0252)
TAX .1007 .5561 .6836
(.0821) (.1680)* (.2515)*
PEXP .0792 .2211 .4438
(.0425)** (.0869)* (.1300)*
DEXP .4442 .9214 1.5456
(.2426)** (.4952)** (.7407)*
FIN .3074 -.5363 -.3676
(.3883) (.7923) (1.1848)
WAGES .0203 -.0424 -.0325
(.0252) (.0515) (.0769)
PUR -.1660 -1.2248 -2.7167
(.3547) (.7227)** (1.0801)*
RS 2.1828 .5958 .1481
(1.2372)** (2.5204) (3.7668)
RSCUST .0492 .1556 -.1695
(.0383)*** (.0866)** (.1344)***
CONSTANT 1.7401 7.4403 17.1263
Standard errors are in parentheses
*Significant at 1 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
**Signif icant at 5 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
***Significant at 10 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
TABLE 5
SUR EQUATIONS
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL RATES
1973
Independent
Variables Dependent Variables N=72
COMMERCIAL
(11) (12)
PC375 PC10,000
INDUSTRIAL
(13) (14)
PI30,000 PI400,000
DAP .6225
(.9045)
11.5122
(12.8608)
35.8358
(25.9907)***
735.6230
(322.6040)*
SALES -.0091
(.0295)
.2696
(.4204)
.4166
(.8527)
-1.5949
(10.5840)
TAX .3364
(.2889)
10.6253
(4.1056)*
45.5089
(8.2962)*
467.3370
(102.9580)*
PEXP .5488
(.1514)*
7.0509
(2.1516)*
17.4636
(4.3542)*
254.4410
(54.0418)*
DEXP 2.0564
(.8690)*
28.9334
(12.3654)*
-25.1163
(25.2887)
15.6585
(314.1110)
FIN 1.5981
(1.3827)
-15.9105
(19.6485)
-11.1177
(39.7435)
-220.4730
(493.2440)
WAGES .0989
(.0911)
.0578
(.1297)
1.1433
(2.6600)
-16.7584
(33.0425)
PUR -2.1862
(1.2705)**
-50.7016
(18.0530)*
-61.2100
(36.5008)**
-1250.2000
(452.9900)*
RS 10.6608
(4.4339)*
16.4122
(63.0052)
126.0510
(129.7230)
1190.7300
(1611.1500)
CSCUST .0374
(.0151)*
.6499
(.2329)*
ISCUST .0001
(.0012)
.0091
(.0159)
CONSTANT 4.3025 151.6540 360.7790 2994.0800
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Signif icant at 1 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
**Signif icant at 5 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
***Signif icant at 10 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
TABLE 6
SUR EQUATIONS
RESIDENTIAL RATES
1979
Independent
Variables Dependent Variables N=71
(15) (16) (17)
PR100 PR500 PR1000
DAP .1008 .7534 1.4607
(.5547) (1.2629) (2.0284)
SALES -.0320 -.0864 -.0899
(.0130)* (.0294)* (.0482)**
TAX .2714 .9460 1.4720
(.0735)* (.1661)* (.2723)*
PEXP .0317 .2532 .6342
(.0311) (.0707)* (.1147)*
DEXP -.0772 -.4732 -1.3197
(.2015) (.4555) (.7462)**
FIN -.4076 -1.9292 -2.8834
(.5881) (1.3316)*** (2.1729)***
WAGES .1472 .8610 1.8914
(.1540) (.3486)* (.5697)*
PUR .2066 -1.6908 -5.2243
(.6182) (1.3975) (2.2906)*
RS -2.3450 -7.3879 -10.2877
(1.8413)*** (4.1640)** (6.8165)***
RSCUST .1167 .3006 .2729
(.1103) (.2555) (.3893)
CONSTANT 5.3094 13.4702 22.5503
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Significant at 1 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
**Signif icant at 5 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
***Signif icant at 10 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
TABLE 7
SUR EQUATIONS
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL RATES
1979
Inde-
pendent
Variables Dependent Variables N=71
COMMERCIAL
(18) (19)
PC375 PC10,000
INDUSTRIAL
(20) (21)
PI30,000 PI400,000
DAP -.2988
(2.1562)
12.7370
(35.7404)
18.8240
(88.4441)
966.9600
(1078.3700)
SALES -.0857
(.0591)***
-.1441
(.9803)
1.2506
(2.4399)
24.2293
(29.8086)
TAX .0651
(.3392)
8.7747
(5.6175)**
20.7011
(13.8471)***
254.1060
(168.8610)*'
PEXP .1319
(.1319)
4.1641
(2.1879)**
9.3947
(5.4280)**
159.4870
(66.2101)*
DEXP .4433
(.9198)
-4.4376
(15.2555)
-35.8515
(37.8820)
-394.0720
(462.1180)
FIN .6320
(2.6057)
-5.6709
(43.2165)
-117.3450
(107.2260)
-1436.0000
(1307.5500)
WAGES 1.4699
(.6957)*
25.5597
(11.5172)*
70.5881
(28.3796)*
847.3700
(346.1600)*
PUR -5.2632
(2.8357)**
-105.0320
(47.0076)*
-304.3420
(116.3210)*
-3378.9800
(1417.9500)*
RS -3.9062 -11.2578 159.2830 3548.2300
(8.3527) (138.5260) (344.0430) (4197.7100)
CSCUST .0164
(.0275)
.1776
(.4068)
ISCUST .0040
(.0025)**
.0760
(.0382)**
CONSTANT 18.8352 296.0810 868.9870 7641.1200
Standard errors are in parentheses
*Significant at 1 percent. confidence level (one-tailed test).
**Signif icant at 5 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).
***Signif icant at 10 percent confidence level (one-tailed test).



